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Liability of Accountants Under Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934
(INCLUDING AMENDMENTS TO SECURITIES ACT OF 1933)
By Spencer Gordon
At a meeting of the American Institute of Accountants at New 
Orleans, October 17, 1933, a paper was read entitled Accountants 
and the Securities A ct. This dealt with the problems of accountants 
under that statute, the origin and extent of their responsibility, 
the defenses available to them in case of suit and the extent of 
their liability. The address was afterwards published in The 
Journal of Accountancy for December, 1933.
Title 2 of the securities exchange act of 1934 (which I shall call 
the 1934 act) contains certain amendments to the securities act 
of 1933 (which I shall call the 1933 act) which make substantial 
changes in the liability of accountants under that statute. With­
out repeating what has already been said in the article A ccountants 
and the Securities Act, I shall here attempt to state what these 
changes are. Title I of the 1934 act also imposes certain new 
liabilities, and I shall discuss these briefly.
Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 
Prima-facie case
In any action against an accountant under section 11of the 
1933 act, before the recent amendments, the plaintiff must sustain 
the burden of proof that there has been, in the part of the registra­
tion statement attributed to the accountant, an untrue statement 
of a material fact or the omission to state a material fact required 
to be stated in the registration statement or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading, and the plaintiff must also 
sustain the burden of proof that he has acquired such security, and 
that the accountant has with his consent been named as having 
prepared or certified the statement which is the subject of the 
suit. If the plaintiff establishes these facts, the burden of proof is 
then imposed on the defendant to establish the defenses allowed 
under section 11 (b), which have been discussed fully in the paper 
Accountants and the Securities Act.
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Section 206 of the 1934 act amends the securities act of 1933 as 
follows:
“Sec. 206 (a), section 11 (a) of such act is amended by adding 
after the last line thereof the following new sentence: “If such 
person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally 
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a 
period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date 
of the registration statement, then the right of recovery under this 
subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired 
the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration 
statement or relying upon the registration statement and not 
knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established 
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such 
person.’”
This provision is self-explanatory and adds another requirement 
which must be met by the plaintiff in such cases as fall with the 
amendment. The burden is on the plaintiff to make the proof 
required. This amendment is thus beneficial to accountants.
Proof of Belief in Certain Cases
In the article Accountants and the Securities Act attention was 
called to the fact that in a balance-sheet or profit-and-loss state­
ment certified by an accountant there may be items as to which he 
indicates that he in turn has relied upon another expert, or that 
the accountant’s certificate may in part purport to be a statement 
made by an official person or a copy of or an extract from a public 
official document.
The provisions of the statute have been changed in regard to 
such cases. Section 206 (b) of the 1934 act amends section 11 of 
the 1933 act as follows:
“ (b) Clauses (C) and (D) of paragraph (3) of section 11 (b) of 
such act are amended to read as follows: ‘ (C) as regards any part 
of the registration statement purporting to be made on the 
authority of an expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a 
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert (other 
than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not 
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement be­
came effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that 
there was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead­
ing, or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly 
represent the statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or 
extract from the report or valuation of the expert; and (D) as re­
gards any part of the registration statement purporting to be a 
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statement made by an official person or purporting to be a copy of 
or extract from a public official document, he had no reasonable 
ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such part of 
the registration statement became effective, that the statements 
therein were untrue, or that there was an omission to state a 
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make 
the statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the 
registration statement did not fairly represent the statement 
made by the official person or was not a fair copy of or extract 
from the public official document.’”
Before the amendment the 1933 act read:
“. . . he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe 
. . . that the statements therein were true and that there was no 
omission . . . or . . . that such part of the registration state­
ment fairly represented ... or was a fair copy . . .”
The change of language from positive to negative will apparently 
result in defendants’ being held in the middle class of cases where 
there was reasonable ground to believe that the statements were 
true and that there was no omission, or that they fairly repre­
sented, or were fair copies; but there also existed some reasonable 
ground for believing the contrary. In such cases defendants 
would have escaped liability under the 1933 act, but will be held 
under the amendment. To put it simply, it seems to me that it 
will be more difficult to sustain the burden of proof that there has 
been no reasonable ground to believe a statement untrue than to 
sustain the burden of proof that there has been reasonable ground 
for believing it true. (Arthur H. Dean, in Fortune September, 
1934, disagrees with this view, but it seems to me that the burden 
now required of defendants under clauses (C) and (D) is very 
similar to the burden of proof imposed on the state in criminal 
cases, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.)
It should be noted, however, that there has been no change in 
the language of section 11 (b) (3) (B) of the 1933 act which deals 
with the situation that usually is presented in a suit against an 
accountant. This section remains as follows:
. . as regards any part of the registration statement pur­
porting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting 
to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself 
as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reason­
able ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of 
the registration statement became effective, that the statements 
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a 
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material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make 
the statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the reg­
istration statement did not fairly represent his statement as an 
expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or valua­
tion as an expert”; (Section 11 (b) (3) (B).)
Standard of Reasonableness
In the article Accountants and the Securities Act the standard of 
reasonableness provided by section 11 (c) of the 1933 act was 
discussed. By section 206 (c) of the 1934 act this subsection has 
been amended to read as follows:
“‘(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of 
subsection (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable in­
vestigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of rea­
sonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the 
management of his own property.’”
This amendment is an improvement in that it removes the doubt­
ful language of the former section that “the standard of reason­
ableness shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary 
relationship.”
Damages
The section of the 1933 act in regard to damages has been 
completely changed by the 1934 act to read as follows:
“(d) Subsection (e) of such section 11 is amended to read as 
follows:
“‘(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to 
recover such damages as shall represent the difference between the 
amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the 
security was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of 
the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such 
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or 
(3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of 
after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than 
the damages representing the difference between the amount paid 
for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was 
offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such 
suit was brought: provided, that if the defendant proves that any 
portion or all of such damages represents other than the deprecia­
tion in value of such security resulting from such part of the regis­
tration statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, 
not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not be 
recoverable. ... In any suit under this or any other section of 
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this title the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking 
for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party 
litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs 
may be assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or not 
such undertaking has been required) if the court believes the suit 
or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient 
to reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in 
connection with such suit, such costs to be taxed in the manner 
usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which the suit 
was heard.’ ”
This amendment removes the ambiguous language of section 11 
(e) of the 1933 act which was discussed at length in the article 
Accountants and the Securities Act. The amended section seems 
reasonably clear. The recovery of the consideration paid for the 
security is eliminated, and liability is restricted to the recovery of 
damages measured by losses the basis of which is clearly set forth 
and not left to conjecture as in the 1933 act. The amendment 
further restricts the damages to
"the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such 
part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liabil­
ity is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading. . . .”
but places the burden on the defendant on this point. The court 
may require an undertaking from and may assess costs and at­
torney’s fees against the defendant as well as against the plaintiff.
This amendment to section 11 (e) of the 1933 act is a decided 
improvement from the standpoint of the accountants, and it takes 
care of much of the criticism of the 1933 act. The provision as to 
burden of proof is disappointing but is relatively unimportant 
compared to the clarification of the damage question and restric­
tion of damages to depreciation in value resulting from the mis­
statement or omission.
Section 11 (g) of the securities act of 1933 becomes nugatory in 
view of the provisions of the amendment to section 11 (d).
Limitation
By section 207 of the 1934 act, the provisions as to limitation on 
suits are changed to read as follows:
"No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created 
under section 11 . . . unless brought within one year after the 
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discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such 
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence ... In no event . . . more than three years after the 
security was bona fide offered to the public.”
By the 1933 act, the limitations had been two years and ten years 
respectively.
Reliance on Regulations
Section 209 (b) of the 1934 act amends the 1933 act as follows:
“ (b) Subsection (a) of such section 19 is further amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: ‘No provi­
sion of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done 
or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation 
of the commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation 
may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be 
determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any 
reason.’”
No such provision was contained in the 1933 act, and this amend­
ment should be effective in protecting an accountant who relies on 
the rules and regulations of the commission.
Liability Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Up to this point I have been discussing the 1934 act only so far 
as it amended the 1933 act. There is also in the securities act of 
1934 an express provision regarding liability arising under that 
statute as follows:
“Sec. 18. (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made 
any statement in any application, report, or document, filed 
pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, which 
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances 
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any 
material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such 
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such 
statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which 
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such 
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good 
faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or 
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue 
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any 
such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking 
for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable 
costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either party 
litigant.
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“ (b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under 
this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from 
any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been 
liable to make the same payment.
‘‘ (c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability 
created under this section unless brought within one year after the 
discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within 
three years after such cause of action accrued.”
It seems to me that this section 18 (a) of the 1934 act is less drastic 
and more equitable than the rather involved provisions of the 
1933 act, even as now amended. Some of the differences are the 
following: (1) Under the 1934 act the statement must be at the 
time and in the light of the circumstances in which it was made 
false or misleading with respect to a material fact. Under the 
1933 act, as amended, a suit may be instituted
“in case any part of the registration statement, when such part 
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead­
ing.”
(2) Under the 1934 act the person suing must have acted “in 
reliance upon such statement.” Under the 1933 act as amended, 
reliance is required only
“If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made 
generally available to its security holders an earning statement 
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the 
effective date of the registration statement.”
(3) Under the 1934 act only “damages caused by such reliance ” 
can be recovered. This is perhaps also true under the involved 
language of the 1933 act as now amended, but the burden is 
placed on the defendant to show that the damages claimed did not 
result from the statement.
(4) Under the 1934 act, the defendant may escape liability by 
proving that he “acted in good faith and had no knowledge that 
such statement was false or misleading.” In the article Account­
ants and the Securities Act and in this article I have discussed the 
rather involved defenses under the 1933 act.
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